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HISTORY IN PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVE
PHILIP J. KAIN
Kant's Political Theory and Philosophy of
History'
The uniqueness, the real achievement, and the importance of
Kant's political thought, which has not always been taken as seriously
as it deserves, can best be understood if we do two things: compare
it to political theory as it existed before Kant, and see how it includes
and fundamentally depends upon his philosophy of history. It is
Kant's philosophy of history that allows him, in his political thought,
to take a major step beyond previous political thinkers.
Traditional political theory (before Kant) almost always did one
or the other of two things—never both. One sort of theorist speculated
about the ideal state in Utopian fashion, that is, without really
attempting to explain how such a state might be brought about in
the real world. Plato and Thomas More would be good examples
of this approach. For Plato it was simply a legitimate and worthwhile
philosophical endeavor to try to understand the nature of justice even
if it could not be realized in the actual world. For Thomas More,
as well as for Plato, such an ideal at least provided a standard to
use in criticizing existing society.
The other traditionad approach was the opposite. It was relatively
unconcerned with ideals and simply sought to examine the actual,
empirical dynamics of real world power struggles. It studied human
self-interest and aggression in order to understand political reality
adequately enough to be able to act in it with some chance of success.
1. I would like to thank Michael Brint, Michael Meyer, William Parent, and James
Felt, S.J., for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Thrasymachus in Book I of Plato's Republic, to some extent Thu-
cydides, and in large part Machiavelli did this.
Until Kant, politiccd theorists tended, for the most part, in one
or the other of these opposed directions. From the perspective of
power dynamics, the concern with justice and morality often appeared
naive, Utopian, or at best hopeless. As Machiavelli says, "How we
live is so different from how we ought to live that he who studies
what ought to be done rather than what is done will learn the way
to his downfcdl."^ After cdl, what can morcd investigations tell us
about the actual workings, let alone the stable consolidation, of
political structures? What can the moralist hope to do: merely argue
that we should get everyone to behave morally, that we educate
people, or that we should turn the administration of the state over
to a wise and just philosopher? If that is all you have to say, why
bother doing political theory? You are hopelessly naive.
But, on the other hand, from the perspective of the moralist,
to simply analyze power dynamics is totally to abandon the most
important considerations of political theory, namely, the development
of human virtue, justice, and the good life. The ability to manipulate
power may gain you your self-interest, may even produce order, but
never virtue, dignity, or justice.
Kant, for the first time—and this is what makes him, perhaps,
the first truly great political theorist of the modern period—seriously
attempts to take both of these approaches. Political theory, for Kant
and for many after him, must not only discuss the ideal state but
must also have a theory of how to actually realize the ideal. It must
analyze actual power struggles, self-interest, and conflict, but do so
in order to show how this empirical dynamic, if properly understood,
can be morally guided toward the realization of the ideed society.'
2. Niccol6 Machiavelli, The Prince (F), trans. Thomas G. Bergin (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947), 44 (my emphasis).
3. It might be argued that Aristotle and Locke adopted both of these approaches
to political theory before Kant did. But I would hold that this is not so. Aristotle
and Locke do empirically consider what goes on in actual societies (Aristotle, for
example, collects the constitutions of all the Greek city states) and they also talk a
bit about the best state. But neither has a real theory for how an empiricd dynamic
will actually realize the ideal state—and certainly no philosophy of history. On the
other hand, I have argued elsewhere that in Hobbes's writings one can sense the
beginnings of an attempt to take both of these approaches, but Hobbes's attempt was
far less successful than Kant's; see my "Hobbes, Revolution, and the Philosophy of
History," in Hobbes's 'Science of Natural Justice,' ed. C. Walton and P. J . Johnson
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 203-18.
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In other words, it is Kant's philosophy of history that makes for
the greatness of his political theory.
For Kant, there are two forces at work in history. One is the
empirical dynamic of conflicting self-interests. The other is morality.
And both, if understood properly, will lead us toward the very same
goal: peace, a league of nations, international law, and just societies.
Let us first examine the conflict of particular interests.
Kant begins his essay, the "Idea for a Universal History," by
noticing a paradox, namely, that rates of birth, marriage, and death
in any given population are stable. This is a paradox because mar-
riages, and at least to some extent births and deaths, depend upon
or are influenced by individual choices which involve free will, but
nevertheless, we can accurately predict rates of birth, marriage, and
death in the population as if they were causally determined in the
strictest possible way.* How are we to make sense of this?
One explanation, Kant suggests, is that individuals (motivated
by their own inclinations, decisions, or choices) seek only their own
particular purposes, but in some way (which will have to be explained)
each individual furthers, without realizing it, some common but
unknown purpose or end {UH, 12; Ak 8:17). In other words, there
is some sort of directedness, some sort of purposiveness, operating
here behind the scenes—a purpose which individuals are completely
unconscious of, a purpose which is not the purpose of any individual.
They seek only their own personal, particular ends, but some larger,
common purpose is realized without their intending it.
If we were able to understand this purposiveness, then perhaps
we could direct it. Perhaps we could even direct it so that history
progresses toward a state in which human beings are both moral
and happy {UH, 13-14; Ak 8:19-20). If we could understand this
directedness in history, humans perhaps could control their own
destiny.
Kant thinks that human selfishness is the key here. More spe-
cifically, he thinks that we find two different propensities within
human beings. He sums these up as "unsocial sociability." Human
beings have an unsocial propensity—a propensity to isolation, self-
4. "Idea for a Universal History" {UH), in On History, ed. Lewis White Beck
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 11; for the German see Kant's gesammelte Schriften
{Ak), ed. Koniglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1910- ), 8:17.
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ishness, and lack of concern with the interests of others. But they
also have a social propensity—a propensity to associate with others
in society. They need others just to stay alive. They must cooperate
with others to be able to produce enough to satisfy their basic needs.
And after all, even aggression would not get very far without someone
nearby to attack. As Rousseau pointed out in his Discourse on Inequality,
selfishness is only possible in a situation where you can compare
yourself to others and prefer yourself. In other words, selfishness is
only possible in a social setting.^
These two factors then—being close enough to others, associating
with them, plus our selfishness—produce conflict, competition, and
even war. While there is an obvious negative side to this conflict,
we must also attend to the positive side, which perhaps is even more
important. Conflict and selfishness, even avarice and lust for power,
do, after all, awaken our human powers and stir us out of com-
placency. Selfishness drives us to accomplish things; competition
sharpens our abilities. We develop our human potentialities. We are
driven toward the fullest development of our powers and capacities
{UH, 13, 15; Ak 8:18-19, 21).
So we are driven to society by sociability and the need for
others. Once in society, antagonism, competition, and selfishness set
in and our powers and capacities develop. In fact, for Kant, this
development will eventually lead toward the society of morality,
justice, and peace that he is after.* Selfishness and aggression will lead
toward morality—that is Kant's argument. We must try to understand
how this will occur.
Kant is following Hobbes here. But also in Book II of Plato's
Republic, Glaucon set out a social contract theory of society which,
though much simpler, is very much like Hobbes's theory and will
make it easier for us to understand an important point involved
here. Let us look at Glaucon first.
5. UH, 15; Ak 8:20-21. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,
in The First and Second Discourses, trans. Roger D. Masters and Judith R. Masters
(New York: St. Martin's, 1964), 222; for the French, see Oeuvres completes (OC), ed.
Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 3:219.
6. UH, 15; Ak 8:21. Perpetual Peace {PP), in On History, 106, 111; Ak 8:360-61,
365. Also On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in
Practice,' in Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Gambridge UP,
1971), 90; Ak 8:310-11.
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Glaucon assumes that before individuals established society they
existed alone in relative isolation. Moreover, individuals are selfish
and aggressive—they really prefer doing injustice to others and ben-
efiting themselves. And if they were powerful enough, or if, as
Glaucon puts it, they had magic rings like Gyges, they would do
exacdy what Gyges did—seek their own self-interest and injure others.
But alas, for Glaucon, such rings exist only in stories, which is to
say that Glaucon, at least in part, disagrees with Thrasymachus,
whose argument we heard in Book I of Plato's Republic. Glaucon
and Thrasymachus agree that individuals are selfish and aggressive.
But Glaucon does not agree with Thrasymachus that some people
are superior. If some people were superior or more powerful, they
would rise to the top of the struggle and establish order in this way.
For Thrasymachus, if cdl are selfish and aggressive, but some are
superior, the superior will gain control and establish justice in their
own interest. For Glaucon, this is illusion. Much as he might wish
for it, it only happens in mythology. All are selfish and aggressive,
but at the same time, alas, Jill are equal. Therefore, the only way
out of this chaos of conflict between bumbling equals is to make a
contract which establishes society, order, and justice in the interest of
all. Nevertheless, for Glaucon, justice is second best. People really
prefer doing injustice and pursuing their self-interest, but lacking
magic rings, they realize that this is impossible; that they will fail
and be hurt; and that others will do them injustice. So they setde
for justice, order, and security in the interest of all {Republic, 358b-
361e).
Hobbes's views are similar. He begins with the hypothetical
notion of a state of nature, which is to say, a condition of human
beings where no political institutions, laws, or morals have been
established or are in effect. In this state of nature, for Hobbes,
human beings are selfish and aggressive. They also are equal, mo-
tivated by a concern for self-preservation, and rational.
Given their natural selfishness and aggression, they will fight.
There will be, as Hobbes puts it, a war of all against all. But since
all are equal, no one will be able to impose order by establishing
power over the others. All will simply be threatened by this very
dangerous state of conflict. Given their concern for self-preservation,
they will fear for their lives and begin to seek a way out of this
chaos. Given that they are rational, they will eventually discover
that, since all are equal and thus that none will successfully rise to
the top of the struggle, the only way out is to come to an agreement
and establish a social contract. If we grant Hobbes's assumptions
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concerning the nature of human beings, we will have to admit that
individuals will inevitably be driven to this social contract. They will
have to relinquish their power to a sovereign who establishes order,
security, and justice.'
Kant takes up the Hobbes-Glaucon model but extends it to the
relationship between nations. For Kant, the same conflict that drives
individuals from a state of nature to society, drives societies toward
law and morality. Once political societies exist, conflict and war
between individuals ceases—law and authority puts an end to it.
Instead, conflict and war take place at a more general (and more
destructive) level; it occurs between nations. Gonflict and war, just
as it forced individuals to society, law, and authority, will force
nations toward a league of nations, lawful regulations, and a common
authority. Wars, revolutions, and conflicts will continue remaking
the international political map until we get a league of nations and
international peace {UH, 18-20; Ak 8:24-26. PP, 106-8; Ak 8:361-
63).
Just as at the level of individuals, so at the international level,
there are two important propensities in operation. There is an "un-
social sociability" between nations. On the one hand, we find the
assertion of national self-interest which drives nations toward ag-
gression and war. But there is also an important form of sociability
between nations, namely, their interest in commerce, trade, and
economic interaction. It is the dynamic interplay between these two
factors, this international unsocial sociability, that will lead toward
a league of nations, peace, and international law. War, for Kant, will
lead toward the end of war.
As wars become more serious, destructive, and expensive, they
become more uncertain. They come into conflict with ever-increasing
economic interests. Wars, as they become more disruptive, interfere
with trade. As world trade grows, as nations become more inter-
dependent, as they rely more and more on each other commercially,
war poses an ever greater threat to the smooth functioning of the
international market. At the first sign of war, other nations will
intervene to arbitrate, to quash the war, in order to secure their
own national commercial interests. This is the first step toward a
league of nations.'
7. For a fuller discussion of Hobbes's views, see my "Hobbes, Revolution, and
the Philosophy of History." (See note 3).
8. UH, 23; Ak 8:28. PP, 114; Ak 8:368. Theory and Practice (TP), 90; Ak 8:310-11.
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As commerce continues to increase and as wars become even
more expensive and destructive, we move further toward a league
of nations. With the establishment of this league, pressure will be
put on each nation to establish civil freedom and just internal con-
stitutions because any domestic threat to peace within a specific
nation will be of concern at the international level, since it could
eventually affect other nations.
Kant's philosophy of history exhibits a mixture of real insight
and real error. In modern times the relations between major powers
in many ways have borne out Kant's prophecies. The threat of
serious conflict between major powers often drives them to back off,
negotiate, and compromise. Kant's model seems to work between
major powers that are relatively equal in strength. It will not work
between powers that are very unequal in strength. Commercial self-
interest, rather than hinder the outbreak of war, may very well drive
a powerful nation to invade a smaller and weaker one, especially if
the war can be handled so as not to draw other powerful nations
into direct conflict and if the powerful nation thinks it can clean
things up quickly and get its way economically. From the other side,
a weak and poor nation may well find itself driven to almost suicidal
revolt in order to attempt to throw out a powerful nation if they
think circumstances will allow for even a hope of success. And,
indeed, we have seen many wars of this sort in recent times. More-
over, the interests of powerful nations may lead them to side with
different factions in a weciker nation if the powerful nations think
they can avoid direct conflict with each other and if they think the
generEil conflict can be contained.
So Kant's model does not work in all areas. Nevertheless, what
is really interesting about it is the notion that selfishness and aggression
lead toward peace, law, and morality. This is a secular version of
the traditional theological view that God's providence brings good
out of evil. Human evil or self-seeking is used by God, or by history,
to bring about a good result which humans neither intended nor
foresaw. However, this makes for a radically different picture of the
proper relation of mor2ility to self-interest. Traditionally, it was mor-
ality's task to suppress self-interest, even annihilate it if possible.
Think of Plato or Thomas More. For Kant, morality's task is not
to suppress self-interest or conflict. Kant argues that self-interest,
conflict, and war are leading toward the very same end that moral
reflection would have dictated from the start {UH, 18-9; Ak 8:24-
25. PP, 112-13; Ak 8:366-67). The task of morality is to use this
conflict, guide it, not suppress it, at least not immediately.
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Let us move on to the second force at work in history, namely,
morality. For Kant, the categoricad imperative is the general form
of the moral law. It is not a specific law with a specific content. It
is a general form which allows us to discover or test the morality
of any specific maxim. What we need, to perform this test, is to
know the general form of law—the general form which any law must
have if it is to be a moral law. All laws, in the first place, are
commands or imperatives. They command us to do something or
command us not to do it. It is necessary that we do it or not do it.
Secondly, they tell us to do it or not to do it in aU cases without
exception. They tell us to do it or not to do it universally.^ The
general form of law, then, is the categorical iniperative—a universal
and necessary command.
We examine any situation, ask how we want to act, and
formulate that action as a maxim—for example, we say, "We will
steal whenever we want to ." We then ask whether, if this maxim
were formulated in a universal and necessary fashion, we could will
to carry it out. We must act only on that maxim which we could
will to be a universal law of nature {F, 18-19, 39 ff.; Ak 4:402-3,
421 ff.)
To make this maxim universal and necessary we would say:
"Everyone should steal always and under all conditions." We im-
mediately see that this would be impossible—a contradiction. We
might decide to steed in a specific situation where it served our
particular interest, but we would reject stealing when it is univer-
salized. Universalizing the maxim allows us to see what can be a
moral law and what cannot. For Kant, morality must be determined
by reason, not interest. We might feel that it is in our interest to
steal in a particular situation, but our reason tells us plainly that
stealing in general—universalized stealing—must be rejected. For
Kant, we engage in this rational analysis of a maxim in order to
separate our interests, feelings, or inclinations about a particular act
from our rational, abstract assessment of what is moral in general.
For Kant, to be moral is to act rationally. It is not moral to
be determined by interest or inclination. Only if we are determined
by reason are we free, self-determined, and moral. If we are de-
termined by our interests, inclinations, or feelings, for Kant, we are
not free. We would be determined by natural forces (or by motives
9. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals {F), trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), 18-19; Ak 4:402-3.
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determined by natural forces) and thus we would be caus2dly de-
termined heteronomously. We are only self-determined if we are
determined by our reason,'"
To put this another way, it is not enough to act simply in
accordance with reason or in accordance with the categorical imperative,
we must do the act for the sake of the categorical imperative or, the
same thing, because it is rational and for this reason alone. The
only thing that can determine the action, if we are to be free and
moral, is our own reason—this rational analysis—and nothing else
{F, 6, 14-15; Ak 4:390, 397-99).
If we simply refrain from stealing, we do act in accordance
with the categorical imperative—in external agreement with it. But
if our actual motive is simply to have a good reputation, or to be
liked, or because we like the other person, we are being determined
by inclination or feeling, and then we are not free or moral. We
are not acting for the sake of the moral law. We must refrain from
stecding because it is rationed, or, the same thing, because it is the
moral law, the categorical imperative—because it can be universcdized.
Only in this way are we free. Only in this way are we determined
by reason, not inclination. Moreover, if we are to be moral, for
Kant, we must not even be determined by our long-term interests,
even the long-term interests of others or of society. If we are, we
will be determined by inclination, not reason. Nor can we be mo-
tivated by a concern for results, consequences, or outcomes of the
act. Utility, benefit, good to ourselves or to others must not determine
us. Or again, we would be determined by inclination, not reason
{F, 10, 14-17; Ak 4:394, 397-401. CPrR, 122; Ak 5:117-18).
We must simply analyze: ask if the maxim can be universalized.
We must be determined only by this rational analysis if we are to
be free and moral. It is only the intention, the volition, the rationality
of the act, which makes it morsd.
We might take a moment here to compare Kant's ethics to
Rousseau's concept of the general will—certainly the most central
and also the most obscure notion to be found in the Social Contract.
Kant's ethics can help us understand the concept of the general will,
and the concept of the general will (which comes very close to being
a categorical imperative) can help us understand Kant's categorical
imperative and eventucdly Kant's place in the history of political
theory.
10. F, 62-63; Ak 4:444. Critique of Practical Reason {CPrR), trans. Lewis White Beck
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), 66; Ak 5:64.
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Rousseau makes claims about the general will that, at first
sight, seem quite extravagant. He claims, for example, that the general
will never errs about what is right, that it always seeks the common
good, and that it naturally tends to equality." The general will, at
least in theory, I think, can do all of these things. But to see this
we must understand the general will correctly.
First, we must notice that the general will is not to be confused
with anyone's particular will, which is to say, their self-interest.
Rousseau very clearly says that the general will is not the will of
all. The will of all he takes to be the sum of all particular wills or
the sum total of all the different particular interests of the citizens.
The will of all is what is registered in any ordinary majority vote
{SC, 61; OC 3:371). The general will, then, is not the vote of the
majority. It is true that for the general will to manifest itself there
must be a majority vote, but the general will is not to be identified
with an ordinary vote of the majority as we shadl see in a moment.
The general will can manifest itself and do what it is supposed
to do (never err, always seek the common good, and so forth) given
four conditions which Rousseau lays out in the Social Contract, but
unfortunately not all in one place. The four conditions are the
following. First, all citizens must vote as individuals on all questions
or laws. Second, all questions put to these citizens must have an
abstract and universal form; they must not name a particular person
or fact. Third, the question put must always and only be, "What
is the general will on this matter?" You must be asking: "What is
the common good, the good of the community?" You must not
address the citizens as individuals and ask them what their particular
interests are. Fourth, all laws must be rigorously and equally enforced,
and everyone must realize, when they are voting, that this will be
the case {SC, 59 n, 62-63, 66, 110-11; OC 3:369 n, 373-4, 378, 440-
41).
The point here is to address only a person's abstract, reflective,
rational interest, not their personal, particular, selfish interest. Citizens
are made to reflect upon what it would be like if everyone always
acted in a specific way. We get them to consider the action as a
universal and necessary principle—as a categorical imperative in
Kant's terminology.
If they do so, even thieves would vote against theft. But if we
were only to address the particular interests of thieves—if we were
11. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract {SC), ed. Roger D. Masters, trans.
Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1978), 59, 61, 67; OC 3:368, 371, 380.
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to ask them whether their particular acts of theft were right—we
might well get some remarkably convincing justifications of those
particular acts of theft. But if we address the abstract, reflective,
rational interest, even of thieves—if we ask whether, in general, in
all cases, everyone should be allowed to steal; if we ask them whether
theft always should be permitted by laws which are rigorously and
equally enforced—then thieves would vote against theft, or at least
a majority would. Some individuals might be unable to put aside
their particular, immediate self-interest; some individuals might be
unable to vote their general interest in the abstract case; but a
majority will be able to do so. The vote of a majority, then, is
necessary to produce the general will, but the general will is clearly
not an ordinary majority vote where each is expected to vote only
their own self-interest. The majority must vote their general interest
in the abstract case if the general will is to manifest itself.'^
The difference between Rousseau and Kant is that, for Rous-
seau, the citizens are expected to vote their interest in the general,
abstract case—their long-term interest as citizens of a community
rather than their immediate interests as particular persons. For Kant,
we must not be determined by interest at all.'^
We shall return to Rousseau shortly, but, getting back to Kant
and to the moral force at work in history, we can easily see that
morality, the categorical imperative, would demand fair laws, just
constitutions, and an end to wars. We could not will that everyone
be allowed to do the opposite. We could not will to universalize
war, unjust constitutions, and unjust laws. Morality would also de-
mand a league of nations {PP, 100; Ak 8:356). And morality, for
Kant, is one of the forces at work in history. Moreover, the other
12. For a fuller discussion of these matters, see my "Rousseau, the General Will,
and Individual Liberty," History of Philosophy Quarterty (forthcoming).
13. Kant himself employs the concept of a "general will" from time to time in his
writings and, much like the categorical imperative, the general will "concerns the
form of right and not the material or object" to which I am related (see 77", 75;
Ak 8:292). Moreover, the general will is incapable of being unjust: see Metaphysical
Elements of Justice: Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals {MEJ), trans. John Ladd (Indi-
anapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 78; Ak 6:313-14. However, for Kant, the general will
does not require that the citizens vote on each law. It is only necessary that they be
given laws that they could have imposed upon themselves. Kant wants a sovereign
that rules autocratically but governs in a republican way (see "What is Enlightenment?"
{WE), in On History, 7; Ak 8:39. TP, 77, 79-81, 85; Ak 8:294, 297-99, 304. Contest
of Faculties {CF), in Kant's Political Writings, 184, 187; Ak 7:87-88, 91. Also, MEJ,
96; Ak 6:328).
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force, as we have already seen, drives us toward the very same point
that morality does. Wars between nations and commercial interests
drive us toward peace, law, and a league of nations. Both morality
and war converge asymptotically to the same end—one consciously,
the other unconsciously {UH, 18-19; Ak 8:24-25. PP, 111-13; Ak
8:365-67. TP, 90; Ak 8:310-11).
In Perpetual Peace, though Kant is not discussing the historiccd
realization of a league of nations but, rather, the organization of a
republican form of government, we see a good example of these two
forces at work:
Many say a republic would have to be a nation of angels, because
men with their selfish inclinations are not capable of a constitution
of such sublime form. But precisely with these inclinations nature
comes to the aid of the general will established on reason, which is
revered even though impotent in practice. Thus it is only a question
of a good organization of the state (which does lie in man's power),
whereby the powers of each selfish inclination are so arranged in
opposition that one moderates or destroys the ruinous effect of the
other. The consequence for reason is the same as if none of them
existed, and man is forced to be a good citizen even if not a morally
good person.
The problem of organizing a state, however hard it may seem,
can be solved even for a race of devils, if only they are intelligent.
The problem is: "Given a multitude of rational beings requiring
universal laws for their preservation, but each of whom is secretly
inclined to exempt himself from them, to establish a constitution in
such a way that, although their private intentions conflict, they check
each other, with the result that their public conduct is the same as
if they had no such intentions."
A problem like this must be capable of solution; it does not
require that we know how to attain the moral improvement of men
but only that we should know the mechanism of nature in order to
use it on men, organizing the conflict of the hostile intentions present
in a people in such a way that they must compel themselves to
submit to coercive laws. Thus a state of peace is established in which
laws have force. . . . (A good constitution is not to be expected from
morality, but, conversely, a good moral condition of a people is to
be expected only under a good constitution). Instead of genuine
morality, the mechanism of nature brings it to pass through selfish
inclinations, which naturally conflict outwardly but which can be
used by reason as a means for its own end, the sovereignty of law,
and, as concerns the state, for promoting and securing intemjJ and
external peace {PP, 112-13; Ak 8:366-67).
Both of these forces are necessary for Kant. One without the
other is not enough. Reason and morality alone, he says, would
never achieve our end. Humans are too corrupt. Our reason alone
is not powerful enough to produce a league of nations and just states
{UH, 17-18; Ak 8:23).
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On the other hand, conflict or war alone will never actually
make us moral. Conflict and war drive us toward peace, a league
of nations, and legality. But this is only to say that our self-interest
drives us toward peace and law—and self-interest, we have seen, is
not moral for Kant. Nevertheless, if the laws which get established
are the sorts of laws that reason and morality demand, and if our
external behavior conforms to these laws, though only due to our
self-interest, if, then, we act in accordance with the law, a great deal
has been gained.'* The next step, obeying the law not through self-
interest but because the law is rational and moral—in other words,
acting for the sake of the law—is a small step, but a step which we
must each make for ourselves. Nothing can force us to be free and
moral.
The notion that conflict leads toward the same result that
morality would have demanded from the start, Kant gets, I think,
from Adam Smith's model of a competitive market economy—or at
least Smith hints in this direction.
In a market economy with a developed division of labor, in-
dividuals are dependent upon others. No one can perform all of the
tasks necessary to satisfy their own needs—no one can produce all
their own food, clothing, shelter, and tools. So each specializes,
performs one narrow task, and relies upon others to perform the
other tasks. Then they exchange goods and services in a market.
There is a thoroughgoing interdependence of each upon all here—
we need others to buy from, sell to, work for, hire, and in a thousand
other ways (both domestically and at the international level).
But despite this interdependence, each individual in a market
economy, for Adam Smith, attends only to their own self-interest.
They are selfish. They seek only their own profit. They pay little
attention to others and only infrequently cooperate with them con-
sciously.
However, for Adam Smith, this self-seeking not only produces
a common good but it does so much more effectively than if in-
dividuals consciously and cooperatively sought to realize the common
good. Active, aggressive, competitive self-seeking, given this economic
interdependence of each upon all, produces a national capital, the
wealth of the nation: that common good, out of which each struggles
to gain their particular share. Self-seeking, through an "invisible
14. On the difference between legality and morality, see MEJ, 19-21; Ak 6:219-20.
Kant also says that perpetual peace is an ideal that can never actually be realized,
but that we can continually approach it as a duty; see MEJ, 124; Ak 6:350.
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hand," Smith says, produces the common good much more effectively
than consciously seeking to produce it would.'^
Rousseau, I think, remains a Utopian moralist largely because
he retains an ancient conception of wealth. He thinks, as Plato and
Thomas More did, that a complex and wealthy society will irrevocably
corrupt its citizens. Wealth turns the citizens away from concern
with the common good and feeds their self-interest. This explains
that remarkable passage in the Social Contract where Rousseau suggests
that a society unfortunate enough to have a great deal of natural
wealth should be a monarchy. Society's wealth should be dumped
upon the Prince and kept away from the citizens. Since wealth
corrupts, it is better to corrupt one person rather than the whole
state.'*
Smith and Kant, however, were able to see how the self-
interested concern for wealth and commerce can lead, if only un-
consciously or through an "invisible hand," toward a common good.
If, for Kant, we are able to locate such an unconscious directedness
in history; if we are able to form an idea for a universal history;
if we can see with Adam Smith that self-seeking combined with
commercial interdependence leads toward the common good; or, much
the same thing, if we can see that in history the dynamic tension
between war and commerce will lead us unconsciously toward the
same point that reason and morality would consciously lead us; then
Kant thinks that the other force at work in history, our own reason,
our own morality, can begin to work to hasten this historical de-
velopment toward its goal {UH, 22; Ak 8:27).
One of the main tasks of any political theorist is to explain
how to reconcile particular interests with the general interest. To
have order, let alone morality and justice, any society must bring
about the common interests of its citizens. If the society is not to
collapse, the interests of the citizens must agree and be harmonious
at least to some extent. The problem is that the only agents that
can be used to realize this harmony of interests are the individual
citizens themselves; and they, presumably, are all motivated by their
own particular and selfish interests. The task of the theorist, then.
15. Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan (New York: Random House,
1937), 423.
16. SC, 92-93; OC 3:415-16. For a fuller discussion of this matter, see my "Rousseau,
the General Will, and Individual Liberty." (See note 12).
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is to explain how these individuals motivated by selfish, particular
interests can produce the common good.
What Plato does, basically, is to remove all social institutions
which feed particular interest. He eliminates money, private property,
and even the family. He then gives certain individuals a philosophical
education that will train them to be concerned with the abstract
common good, and he puts these philosophers in charge of society.
Thomas More does much the same thing though he differs from
Plato in interesting ways.
The trouble here is that there is no attempt to explain how
we can start with selfish individucJs in existing society and move
step by step toward the ideal society in which self-interest has been
eliminated and the common good realized. For More, the ideal merely
exists in a far off land called Utopia—which means "nowhere." For
Plato, the whole project is a philosophical exercise to enable us to
know what justice is. Moreover, whatever might be said in support
of his theory of education, a theory of education is not a political
theory. Education, important as it is in other respects, cannot trans-
form existing society enough to realize the ideal.
Machiavelli, despite first appearances, has a more practical
theory of how to turn particular interests to the common good in
existing society. Anyone who wants to become a Prince will obviously
be motivated by an interest in wealth, personal power, and prestige.
But despite this, Machiavelli's point, if he is read very carefully, is
that Princes cannot be caught up in their own particular interests.
If they are, then sooner or later they will fail. Successful Princes
must consider only the large scale map of competing political forces.
They must be concerned with the stable consolidation of an overall
power structure. To do this, the Prince must be something of a
scientist, and, like a scientist, disinterested. The Prince can be com-
mitted neither to virtue nor cruelty for their own sakes. Princes must
be detached, so that they can use virtue or cruelty—use them merely
as tools or means—to consolidate a stable balance of power. Just as
much. Princes cannot be caught in the grip of their own self-interests,
or they will eventually lose sight of the overall constellation of forces.
They must be committed to nothing but the stable consolidation of
a political power structure. They must be detached from everything
else so that they can view all things only as potential instruments—
things merely to be used. They must have no other commitment to
them. They must put aside their own aims and have the consolidation
of a stable power structure as their only aim {P, 8, 33, 34, 50, 51).
The pressure of power politics, together with a little advice from
Machiavelli, will force the Prince to shift away from personal interest.
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If not, eventually the Prince will simply fail. The Prince, to succeed,
must begin to look beyond narrow self-interest to the establishment
of an ordered power structure, and this, if only in a minimal sense,
is in the common interest.
In Hobbes, we fmd that conflict between self-interested equals
in the state of nature forces each of them, if they are to preserve
themselves in this very dangerous situation, to begin to concern
themselves with their long-term common interest in security, a social
contract, and law. Their self-interest drives them toward the common
interest.
Machiavelli and Hobbes, unlike Plato and More, are not out
to eliminate particular interest, but, like Kant, to use it, to allow
it to lead toward the common good. They take a modern view of
the relation of self-interest to the common good. Nevertheless, the
societies which Machiavelli and Hobbes are able to generate may
have order and even security, but they are certainly not moral, just,
or ideal.
Rousseau's concept of the general will is also a device designed
to transform particular interests into the general interest. He too,
takes a modern view of the relation of self-interest to the common
good. Self-interest is not to be repressed or eliminated. Rather,
individual citizens with particular interests produce the common good
by voting on general questions which ask them to reflect upon and
register the general will. They register their interest in the abstract,
general case. Furthermore, Rousseau's society is just and moral.
However, Rousseau, like Plato and More, gives us no realistic ex-
planation of how to realize such a society. He merely describes it
and its institutional mechanisms."
It is only Kant that pulls £ill these elements together such that
self-interested conflict between nations leads toward just and moral
societies. In Kant, we get both a sketch of the ideal state as part
of an international league of nations and, at the same time, a theory
of the dynamic of power conflicts—a theory which explains not only
how these conflicts will lead historically toward the realization of the
ideal state, but also how we ourselves morally and rationally can
begin directing things toward the realization of this ideal. Kant brings
together in a single theory the two opposed approaches of traditional
political theory, and he oudines the project which later theorists like
17. For a fuller discussion of these matters, see my "Rousseau, the General Will,
and Individual Liberty." (See note 12).
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Marx and others will take up and develop in a more complicated
and sophisticated way.'"
I have argued in this article that Kant's uniqueness and sig-
nificance as a political theorist is due to the fact that he has a theory
both of the ideal state and of how to realize it. This is not to say,
however, that I think that Kant has accomplished this project with
complete success. In my opinion there are several things for which
he must be criticized. While his philosophy of history, his theory of
how to realize the ideal state, is a most interesting one, his theory
of what the ideal state would look like when achieved leaves a great
deal to be desired.
In the first place, Kant often tells us that civil laws are to be
considered legitimate only if they are the sorts of laws that a people
could have given themselves." But it is quite clear that, for Kant,
it is not at all necessary, as it was for Rousseau, that the people
be the ones who actually give themselves these laws. The sovereign
can quite well be the one who gives these laws to them. Kant wants
a sovereign who rules autocratically but governs in a republican way,
that is, who governs in accordance with laws that the people could
have given themselves.'^"
It follows from this that Kant thinks revolution to be immoral.
It is true that if an actual revolution succeeds in bringing about a
more just political constitution, then, for Kant, the citizens ought
to accept that constitution, but, nevertheless, the act of revolution
itself was immoral.2' The only thing that citizens legitimately may
do to further historical development is to criticize their institutions
publicly in order to move the autocrat slowly toward reform {WE,
4-10; Ak 8:36-41. TP, 84-85; Ak 8:304). It seems to me that this
alone would be rather ineffective, but more interestingly, it seems
to me that Kant's arguments against the legitimacy of revolution
wifl not stand up under criticism.
One of his main arguments against revolution is that it is shown
to be illegitimate by the principle of publicity. This principle functions
18. See my Marx and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1988), chap. 1, 2.
19. WE, 7-8; Ak 8:39-40. PP, 93 n; Ak 8:350 n. CF, 184; Ak 7:88. TP, 79-81, 85;
Ak 8:297-99, 304. MEJ, 96; Ak 6:328.
20. PP, 120; Ak 8:372. TP, 77; Ak 8:294. CF, 184, 187; Ak 7:87-88, 91.
21. PP, 120, 130; Ak 8:372-73, 382. TP, 82; Ak 8:301. CF, 182; Ak 7:85. MEJ 89;
Ak 6:322-23.
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in the legal sphere much as the categorical imperative does in the
moreil sphere. No law, for Kant, is legitimate if it cannot stand the
test of publicity. In other words, any maxim is to be considered
unjust if it cannot be publicly avowed without risking the defeat of
its own purpose by CEilling forth opposition to itself. Kant thinks this
principle shows revolution to be illegitimate {PP, 129-30; Ak 8:381-
82). But it seems to me that he confuses a revolution with a coup.
A small conspiratorial group seeking to overthrow the government
probably would be frustrated if it made public its plans. But a
popular revolution supported by the majority of the citizens against
an unjust government would not necessarily frustrate its plans by
making them public. In fact, revolutionaries often complain that one
of the main obstacles to revolution is lack of access to the means
of publicity. Nevertheless, for Kant, the principle of publicity, as it
has been stated, is merely negative. It will indicate which maxims
are unjust. It will not tell us which maxims actually are just ones.
This is so, for example, because a very powerful but unjust gov-
ernment might well be able to make public its repressive plans against
the populace without risking the frustration of these plans in the
least {PP, 130-33; Ak 8:382-85).
However, at the end of his discussion of this matter, Kant
gives us an affirmative principle of publicity: "All maxims which
stand in need of publicity in order not to fail their end, agree with
politics and right combined." In other words, if these maxims can
only attain their end through publicity—if publicity is actually necessary
for their success—then these maxims are just {PP, 134-5; Ak 8:386).
It seems to me that popular revolutions supported by the majority
against unjust governments might well be able to satisfy this affir-
mative principle of publicity and thus serve legitimately to move
society further toward the realization of the ideal society.'^ ^
Kant also has another argument against revolution. He says
in Theory and Practice that,
it would be an obvious contradiction if the constitution included a
law for such eventualities, entitling the people to overthrow the
22. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the second formulation of the categorical
imperative, which requires that we treat all persons as ends in themselves and never
only as means (f, 47 ff; Ak 4:429 ff.), rules out the violence against others that
might be unavoidable in a revolution. Kant suggests that standing armies attached
to the state do treat individuals as means, but that defensive and voluntary citizen
militias do not. {PP, 87; Ak 8:345). For a fuller discussion of these matters, see my
Marx and Ethics, chap. 1 (see note 18).
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existing constitution, from which all particular laws are derived, if
the contract were violated. For there would then have to be a publicly
constituted opposing power, hence a second head of state to protect
the rights of the people against the first ruler, and then yet a third
to decide which of the other two had right on his side. '^
This argument against revolution is persuasive only if we are willing
to agree with Kant, who, like Hobbes and unlike Rousseau, is
assuming that the ruler (the head of state, the government, or the
monarch) is the sovereign. By a sovereign, we mean the highest
actual power and the highest legitimate authority. It is obviously a
contradiction to argue that any group can legitimately overthrow the
sovereign because that would imply that the sovereign was not in
fact the sovereign—not the highest power and legitimate authority.
The group legitimately overthrowing the sovereign would be the
highest power and legitimate authority and thus they would be the
sovereign. And then no group could revolt legitimately against this
sovereign. If you have a sovereign, then to revolt against it legiti-
mately—whoever it is—is incoherent. If you can legitimately revolt
against it, it simply is not the sovereign. If it is to be the sovereign,
then you cannot legitimately revolt against it because it is the highest
legitimate authority.
But what if, as for Rousseau, the people were sovereign? Then
they certainly could overthrow an unjust head of state, monarch, or
government without any of these contradictions arising, and the
constitution could quite consistently contain provisions for this even-
tuality. Because the people and not the government are sovereign,
the people could overthrow the government without acting against
the sovereign at all, or getting involved in contradictions with regard
to the concept of sovereignty. Furthermore, if it were the constitution
that constituted the people as sovereign, then no small group could
overthrow the constitution without giving rise to the same contra-
dictions as discussed above, but the people as sovereign certainly could
change the constitution. What could stop them from doing so if they
were sovereign? To claim that there should be a power to stop them
would be to claim that there should be a power higher than the
people and thus that the people were not sovereign.
Kant also suggests that we could not consistently will to uni-
versalize the maxim that it is legitimate to revolt against an unjust
ruler. To do so would be to make all constitutions insecure and
23. TP, 84; Ak 8:303. See also PP, 130; Ak 8:382. Also MEJ, 86, 140; Ak 6:320,
372.
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produce complete lawlessness {TP, 82; Ak 8:301). Again, this ar-
gument only works if we assume that the ruler is sovereign and that,
without such a ruler, all law, cohesion, and order would be impossible.
But, clearly, if the people are sovereign and if, as such, they are
capable of maintaining order, cohesion, and law, then there would
be no difficulty in getting rid of an unjust ruler who was intended
to serve the people rather than to dominate them. This would be
no more inconsistent than firing an incompetent employee. Kant,
like Hobbes, seems to think that the only force capable of providing
cohesion and order is a political force—the government or sovereign.
Like Hobbes, he seems to have no social theory, that is, no theory
of how cohesion is possible in society apart from the political or
governmental sphere. Social cohesion might be brought about, as for
Locke, by property structure and property interest—or, more gen-
erally, as for Marx, by class structure and class interest. The more
cohesion one finds in society, apart from the political sphere, the
less power the political sphere or government need have. Marx, for
example, thinks that the political state could wither away. Locke
thinks governmental power can be limited. The less social cohesion
one is able to find (or if one has no socieil theory at all, like Hobbes),
the more power the political realm or the government must have.^*
Kant, at times, wavers and becomes quite confusing on these
issues. There are places where Kant seems to claim that the people
are sovereign. For example, in the Metaphysical Elements of Justice, he
tells us that the "legislative authority can be attributed only to the
united Will of the people." {MEJ, 78; Ak 6:313). Here, he seems
to suggest that the people must actually make their own laws. He
then says, "The sovereign of the people (the legislator) cannot at
the same time be the ruler, for the ruler is himself subject to the
law and through it is obligated to another, the sovereign. The
sovereign can take his authority from the ruler, depose him, or
reform his administration, but cannot punish him." {MEJ, 82; Ak
6:317). Here, it seems that the people are sovereign and that they
can even depose the ruler. But for some odd reason they cannot
punish the ruler. This is so because, to "punish the ruler would
mean that the highest executive authority would be subject to coercion,
which is a self-contradiction." {MEJ, 82; Ak 6:317). Here, one begins
to wonder whether Kant is shifting back to the view that the ruler
24. See my "Hobbes, Revolution, and the Philosophy of History" (see note 3), and
also my "Locke and the Development of Political Theory," Annals of Scholarship 5
(1988):334-61.
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rather than the people is sovereign. Two pages later—at least in the
second paragraph of the quotation which follows—it seems clear that
the ruler has again become the sovereign:
If the organ of the sovereign, the ruler, proceeds contrary to the
laws—for example, in imposing taxes, recruiting soldiers, and so on,
so as to violate the law of equality in the distribution of political
burdens—the subject may lodge a complaint . . . about this injustice,
but he may not actively resist.
Indeed, even the constitution itself cannot contain any article
that would allow for some authority in the state that could resist or
restrain the chief magistrate in cases in which he violates the con-
stitutional laws. For he who is supposed to restrain the authority of
the state must have more power than, or at least as much power
as, the person whom he is supposed to restrain . . . . {MEJ, 85, see
also 86; Ak 6:319, 320)
Here the ruler is clearly sovereign—the ruler must have more power
than, or at least as much power as, anyone else in the state. And
even if Kant has claimed, earlier in this text, that the people must
make their own laws rather than submit to an autocrat who makes
the sort of laws they would give themselves, nevertheless, if the people
can do nothing about a ruler who violates these laws, then they have
gained little.
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